Sri-Harsha

In the history of Advaita, in the times before the 10th century the orthodox schools, particularly the Nyaya, were concerned with opposing the Buddhistic schools.  After this period, the influence of Buddhism waned and the attention of the orthodox schools turned in a more pronounced manner against each other.  The Nyaya School justified the reality of the categories of experience as against the philosophy of jagan-mithyatva of Sankara.  This school formed the main target of the criticism of the Advaitins in the 12th and the 13th Centuries.
                        Sri-Harsha flourished during the middle of the 12th Century and he led the opposition against the Nyaya system.  His most important philosophical contribution is the Khandana-khanda-khadya in which he refutes all definitions of Nyaya system intended to justify the reality of the world and tries to show that the world end all world-experiences are purely phenomenal and have no reality behind them.  The only reality is the non–dual Brahman which is of the nature of consciousness.  The Nyaya system holds that whatever is known has real existence.  Sri-Harsha, on the other hand, proves that all that is known is indefinable either as real in the sense in which Brahman is real or as unreal in the sense of an absolute nothing.  They have only relative existence and they are adapted to practical needs of life.  Though the Nyaya system is the main target of Sri-Harsha’s criticism, yet since his arguments are of destructive nature they could be used with some modifications against any other system.  He refutes all definitions of Nyaya and so his dialectic would be valid against any definition of other systems.  Sri-Harsha starts with the thesis that none of our cognitions ever require any proof for their validity.  The Advaita of Sankara and the idealistic school of Buddhism (Vijnanavada) differs in this that while the latter holds that everything including the cognition is unreal and indeterminable, the former holds that knowledge is identical with Reality from which the entire universe proceeds and, therefore, knowledge is real and the entire universe is indeterminable.  It is this distinction between the Advaita school of Sankara and the idealistic school of Buddhism that the critics of Advaita often overlook when they charge that Advaita is akin to the Vijnana-vada school of Buddhism.  Indefinability is the very nature of the objects of the world.  Sri-Harsha contends that no amount of ingenuity can succeed in defining the nature of the objects which have no definable existence.  All the definitions of the objects put forward by the Nyaya writers are shown to be faulty even according to the canons of logical discussions and definitions accepted by the Naiyayika.  Sri-Harsha contends that no definitions of the phenomenal world are possible and that the world of phenomena and all our so-called experiences of it are indefinable.  So the Advaitins could affirm that the indeterminable nature of the world is proved.  Sri-Harsha does not believe in the reality of his arguments.  He employs them without any assumption of their reality or unreality.  If the arguments of Sri-Harsha are proved to be unreal then that establishes his own contention that nothing except the self-luminous Brahman is real.  Sri-Harsha is interested only in refuting the definitions of the Naiyayikas.  And, his conclusion is that the manifold world of our experience is indefinable and the one Brahman is absolutely and ultimately real.

The implication of this argument is that ‘difference’ is due to avidya alone.  Our world of experience consists of knower, the objects known, and the act of knowing.  We cannot define the knower without distinctly referring either to the objects known or to the act of knowing.  Similarly, we cannot define the objects known without a reference to the knower or the act of knowing.  Thus there is a circle of relativity which precludes all possibilities of giving an independent definition of any of the three things.  Hence it must be admitted that the manifold world of our experience is indefinable and Brahman the absolute consciousness alone is ultimately real.  This, in short, is the main theme of the Khandana-khanda-khadya.
                        Sri-Harsha’s place in the history of Advaita is unique as he led the main opposition against the Nyaya School which was active in opposing the philosophy of Sankara.  His main contribution rests in this that he proved that all the definitions used by the Naiyayika to define the objects of the world and on that basis to prove their real existence are faulty, as they involve the defects of mutual dependence, infinite regress, and vicious circle.  He has thus shown that there is no way in which the real nature of things can be proved.  The doctrine of ‘mithyatva’ which is proved on the authority of scriptures is proved on the basis of reasoning by Sri-Harsha.  It is no wonder that Madhusudana-sarasvati incorporates many of the views of Sri-Harsha in his Advaita-siddhi.